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Gunn: American Libraries Association v. Pataki 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.

AMERICAN LIBRARIES ASSOCIATION
V.

PATAKI
969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. June 20,1997)

INTRODUCTION

This case was bought before the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York challenging the constitutionality
of New York Penal Law § 235.21(3). The injunction sought by the
plaintiff's to suspend enforcement of the statute was granted due to
the court's determination that the statute violated the Commerce
Clause. The statute was passed to protect children from being
exposed to pornography on the Internet. New York Penal Law §
235.21(3) makes it a crime for an individual to knowingly
communicate to a minor, via computer, information which, in
whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual
conduct, or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to
minors1 . Section 235.20(6) defines "harmful to minors" as that
quality of any description or representation, in whatever form, of
nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sado-masochistic
abuse, when it: (a) considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest in sex of minors; (b) is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what
is suitable material for minors; and (c) considered as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political and scientific value for minors.'
Analogizing the Internet to an interstate railroad, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
decided that the New York statute violated the Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution for three reasons. The court held
that the practical impact of the New York statute results in the
1. N.Y. § 235.21(3) (MeKinney 1997).
2. N.Y. § 235.20(6) (McKinney 1997).
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extraterritorial application of New York law to transactions
involving citizens of other states, and as a result, is a per se
violation of the Commerce Clause. The court further held the
benefits derived from the statute are not sufficient to justify the
burden on interstate commerce.' Finally, the court determined the
unique nature of the Internet necessitates uniform national
treatment and bars the states from enacting inconsistent regulatory
schemes.4
FACT SUMMARY

The plaintiffs in this action comprise a group of individuals and
organizations that use the Internet to distribute, disseminate, and
communicate information across the country.' The plaintiffs in
this action challenged the New York statute on the grounds that it
violated the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause. The
plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin
enforcement of the statute, while the defendants opposed the
motion.
All of the parties involved communicate on-line both inside and
outside of the state of New York. Each of the plaintiffs
communications are accessible by individuals inside and outside of
New York.6 The list of plaintiffs comprised of several library
associations including the American Library Association, the
Freedom to Read Foundation and the Westchester Library System
The associations participated in this suit because they are both
content providers as well as access points for the Internet.8
Additional plaintiffs in this case include Peacefire, a youth
organization founded in order to protect the rights of those under
18 to use the net, and Public Access Networks Corporation

3. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 184.

4. Id.
5. Id. at 169.
6. Id. at 161.

7. Id.
8. Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 162.
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("Panix"), a for-profit organization from New York City that helps
users create their own pages and hosts on-line discussion groups?
The defendants include the Governor and the Attorney General
of the state of New York. 10 They were concerned that sixty-two
District Attorneys in New York were in the process of prosecuting
claims and feared having their prosecutions preempted by the
proposed injunction. A preliminary injunction would effectively
bar enforcement of the statute whether the action was brought by
the governor or the attorney general.'
To open the court's decision the court began a lengthy
discussion of the Internet and its inherent inability to be contained
within the boundaries of any given state. "The Internet is a
decentralized, global communications medium linking people,
institutions, corporations, and governments all across the world."' 2
The nature of the Internet makes it very difficult to determine its
size at any given moment.1 Currently there are 9.4 million host
computers linked to the Internet and over 40 million people
worldwide using the Internet. 4 No organization or entity controls
the Internet. The random structure of the Internet itself, precludes
any exercise of control. 5
The information available on the Internet is "as diverse as human
thought."' 6 Thus, sexually oriented content is only a small part of
the total content on the Internet. 7 Access to this wealth of
information is distributed in many different ways. The court
delineated six different ways of communicating, (1) One to One
messaging -- E-mail, (2) One to Many messaging--Mail Exploder,
(3) distributed message databases--Usenet groups, (4) Real Time
remote computer utilization--Internet Relay Chat, (5) Real Time

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 163.
Id. at 163.
ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 164.
Id.

15. Id.
16. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842.
17. Id.
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remote computer utilization--Telnet, and (6) remote information
retrieval--the Web."8
Most users sign on to the Internet by using pseudonyms as
usernames. 9 A username is a name arbitrarily selected by the user
that gives the user a distinct identity while preserving anonymity."
Through the use of a username a party's age or geographic location
is not disclosed. 21 Moreover, the use of e-mail allows one to send a
message to another person that is comparable to a first class
letter.2" Problems arise, however, through what is known as a
"chat room". A chat room allows the user to participate in a real
time conversation with the other members of the chat room on a
variety of topics and subjects.23 USENET groups and mail
exploders, which distribute information worldwide, allow large
groups of people to have information disseminated to them without
knowing where or from whom the information originated. 24
The Web is a publishing forum that is comprised of millions of
"web sites" that display content provided by particular persons or
organizations. 2' Every document on the Internet has a logical
address, 26 one that is not in physical space. Any of these addresses
can be either typed directly into the computer or can be navigated
to by use of a search engine.27
Common to each of these platforms is the fact that Internet users
have no way to determine the characteristics of their audience,
such as age and geographic location.2" Similarly, users have no
way of knowing who has accessed their information.29 The speaker
thus has no way of knowing the location, age, or sex of the
recipient of the communication.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 834-35.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 166.
Id. at 165.
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 837.
Id. at 167.
Id.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The PreliminaryInjunction Standard
To be granted a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs' must
demonstrate that they will suffer irreparable harm and show either
a likelihood of success on the merits of a case or a sufficiently
serious question on the merits to warrant litigation.3" The court
determined the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success proving
that the New York statute seeks to regulate communications
entirely outside New York. The court held it placed an undue
burden on interstate commerce, and subjects Internet users to
inconsistent obligations.3" Additionally, the court determined the
plaintiffs showed that they face irreparable injury, an injury that
money cannot compensate for and which is imminent and actual.3"
Any deprivation of rights under the Commerce Clause constitutes
irreparable injury." Since the plaintiffs met this burden they
showed both irreparable injury and a likelihood of success on the
merits.34
B.

Federalismand the Internet: The Commerce Clause

Issues dealing with the Internet, by their very nature, raise
questions of federalism.35 The court pointed out that a person on
the Internet might be subject to inconsistent regulation by states
that the actor never intended to reach.36
Geography is a
meaningless concept on the Internet. Even though geography is
the normal method of determining a state's jurisdiction, the logical

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1991).
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 167.
Id.
Id. at 168.
Id.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 168.
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nature of the Internet precludes this settled line drawing of
boundaries.37
The Commerce Clause is a grant of power to Congress, which
limits the state's ability to interfere with interstate commerce. This
limiting or "dormant" power restricts a state's power in two
ways.3"
The Commerce Clause prohibits regulations that
discriminate against interstate commerce39 , as well as those that
while nondiscriminatory, unduly burden interstate commerce.40
State regulation of those aspects of commerce that require national
treatment is a violation of the Commerce Clause.41 In this case the
court determined that, the New York statute contravenes the
Commerce Clause in three ways: (1) it is an unconstitutional
projection of New York law into conduct that occurs outside of
New York; (2) the burdens placed on interstate commerce
outweigh any benefit New York seeks to obtain; and (3) the
Internet is one of those areas of commerce that the government has
marked off as a national preserve which is protected from
inconsistent state regulation.42 As a result, the court concluded,
only Congress can legislate in this area.43
1. The Act Concerns Interstate Commerce
At oral argument, the defendants proffered testimony to
44
prove that New York only intended to regulate intrastate conduct.
However, the court held the statute, by its terms, applied to any
communication, interstate or intrastate, that fits within the
prohibition. Next, the court held that the legislative history of the
statute evidenced that the legislature intended this statute to apply
to New Yorkers and parties outside the state.45 As part of the
legislative history, the state introduced the story of Alan Paul
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 169.
Id.
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
Id.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Barlow. Mr. Barlow was a pedophile that communicated with a 13
year-old girl about sexually explicit material over a period of
several months.4 6 The citizens of New York were in an outrage
and several newspaper stories were printed calling for reforms. 4 7 If
the New York law had not applied outside the state of New York
then they would have no authority to bind Mr. Barlow over for trial
because he lived in Seattle, well outside of New York.48
The nature of the Internet helps to justify the holding that this
statute applies to interstate commerce.49 The Internet is impervious
to geographic boundaries and the operation of the Internet provides
very little, if any, information about the location of the person on
the other end. 0 No aspect of the Internet can be cut off from use
by users from another state, nor can a participant in a chat room
choose to exclude only those callers from New York."
Additionally, the mechanical transfer of the data itself makes it
virtually impossible to insure that an e-mail message did not travel
through New York. This process, called "packet switching,"
breaks up the data contained in an e-mail into smaller "packets."
After the message is broken down, it is sent through a variety of
phone lines to its eventual destination. 2 Thus, the New York
statute is unable to regulate purely intrastate commerce because on
the Internet, no such communication exists. 3
Having decided that the statute affected interstate
communications, the court next turned to the question of whether
the types of subject matter at issue constitute commerce as
contemplated by the Commerce Clause. 4 Throughout their
history, courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly." In
arriving at its decision, the district court determined that the
46. Id. at 170.
47. Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 170.
48. Id.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 171.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 171.
Id.
Id. at 172.
Id.
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Internet is not exclusively a means of commercial
communication.56 There are many Web sites that exist for nothing
more than the dissemination of information. However, even
though a large part of the services provided by the Internet are
commercial free, that does not take the Internet out of the reach of
the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has expressly held that
the dormant Commerce Clause is applicable to activities
undertaken without a profit motive.5 7 The court reasoned that
commercial use of the Internet is on the rise and even those who
are using the Internet for a noncommercial purpose are participants
commerce by virtue of their consumption of the
in interstate
8
resource.
Here, the court made an analogy to the Internet as being a
railroad or a highway and thus an "instrument of commerce." 9
They serve as conduits for the transport of goods and services.'
The court found that the Internet is not only a means of
communication, but also carries digitized goods and services
around the world. 1 As a result, the court held that the New York
statute is properly scrutinized under the Commerce Clause. 2
2. Overreachingby ExtraterritorialRegulation
The Supreme Court for many years has held that overreaching
by state legislatures is conduct in conflict with the Commerce
Clause.63 Additionally, the Court held that the Commerce Clause
precludes a state from enacting legislation that seeks to export its
domestic policies to the other states.' The court here, however,
said the intent of the legislature was not an issue in the case at bar

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 173.
Id.
Kassel, 450 U.S. at 662.
Id.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 174.
Id.
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935).
Id.
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because the extraterritorial effect of legislation is beyond the scope
of a state's power.6"
Many of the witnesses testified to the extraterritorial nature of
the New York statute. The court relayed the experiences of Rudolf
Kinsky, an artist, Oren Teicher, the President of American
Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, and Lawrence
Kaufinan, the Vice President of the Magazine Publishers of
America.6 6 In each of these situations, the witnesses testified that
they felt the "chill" of the New York statute on their businesses.67
Each said they were losing both sales and accumulated customer
goodwill because of the cutback in availability of some of their
previously available material.6"
In all of their respective
businesses, these people were at a decided disadvantage for
complying with the Act.
Consequently, the court delineated a three step analysis to
addressing state statutes of this nature.6 9 It was reasoned that: (1)
the Commerce Clause precludes the application of a statute to
commerce that takes place entirely outside the state, even if its
effects are felt inside;70 (2) where a state statute seeks to regulate
commerce occurring outside its borders then it is invalid even if the
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature;71 (3) the court
will also consider the burden the statute places on other states and
the effect the statute would have if a similar one was adopted by
every state. 72 The court stated that the need to contain individual
state overreaching is predicated by the fact that one state's
autonomy cannot be protected without limitations being observed
by all fifty states.7"

65. Id.
66. Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 174-75.
67. Id. at 174.
68. Id. at 174-75.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 174-175 (citing Brown-Forman v. New York
State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 176.
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In applying this test to the case at bar, the court found that the
nature of the Internet makes it impossible for New York to restrict
intrastate commerce alone.74 The extraterritorial effects of such
intervention tend to evidence a favoritism of one state's policies
over those where the commerce in question may have originated."
The court held that the statute was a deliberate attempt by New
York to impose its policies on the citizens of every other state that
uses the Internet.76 Such indirect regulating has specifically been
reserved for the federal government by the Constitution and, thus,
any violation thereof is a per se violation of the Commerce
Clause.77
3.

The Burdens Exceed the Value ofAny Local Benefit

The court assumed, arguendo, that even if the effects described
above did not rise to the level of a per se violation, the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce clearly exceeded the value of any
local benefit derived.78 Any question of indirect regulation must be
solved by employing a two step analysis, whereby, the court
examines the legitimacy of the state's interest and determines
whether the burden imposed exceeds the value of the local
benefit.79
The court did not dispute the value of the state's interest in
protecting its children from viewing pornography or from the
danger of pedophilia on an anonymous Internet.8" The court did
not end its inquiry here, however, further finding that the second
stage of the analysis was not cast aside merely because the state
has declared a legitimate interest.81 The court concluded that this is
the portion of the test that the New York statute fails because the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 177.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975).
Patak, 969 F. Supp. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 178.
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local benefits were not overwhelming.82 It analogized to the
Supreme Court's findings on the federal Communications Decency
Act ("CDA").
The Supreme Court found that the CDA will
almost certainly fail in its intended purpose because so much of the
pornography on the Internet does not originate in the United States.
Further the court held that, as a practical matter, the extradition of
defendants from other states will prove burdensome
to New York,
83
harder.
much
that
statute
the
of
making application
The court also looked at the interpretation of the statute by New
York itself. The legislature of New York believed that only
pictorial images need be prohibited while purely textual
communications did not,84 seemingly contradicting to the
reasoning the state proposed for this statute.85 As mentioned
above, one of the most important justifications for this law was the
fact that Alan Barlow had contacted a 13 year old girl on the
Internet and then met up with her. Mr. Barlow's messages were
textual communications, not pictures.8 6 The court said that New
York's justification rings hollow using this analysis.87
The court also viewed this statute as cumulative since New York
already has several laws to protect children from the types of
crimes being committed here, including laws against obscenity and
child pornography.88 Bolstering its opinion, the court noted the
testimony of an investigator for the New York Attorney General's
office, Michael McCartney."
Mr. McCartney testified that an
investigation over a 600 hour period found only two cases that
could not be tried under the existing child pornography laws, and
in neither of the two cases was a prosecution instigated.9"
The court concluded that, when weighed against the minimal
benefits provided to the citizens of New York, this statute places
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 179.
Id.
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 704-5 (6th Cir. 1996).
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 179.
Id.
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an extreme burden on interstate commerce. 91 The statute casts its
net worldwide and thus creates a "chilling effect" on all of those
who will curtail their use of the Internet out of fear of reprisal.92
The state, in an attempt to qualify its position, stated that the
pictures of pornography on the Internet constitute only a small
piece of a giant puzzle.93 However, the court viewed the reach of
this statute as considerably more broad. 94 The court said the state
would include works by Botticelli, Reubens, Matisse and
Cezanne. 95 While highly unlikely that anyone would be prosecuted
for sending Birth of Venus across the Internet, 96 the court saw the
statute as sending a conflicting message. 97 The court said this type
of inconsistent application cannot be tolerated because of the selfcensorship it engenders.98 This self-censorship makes it more
difficult and more expensive for users of the Internet to
disseminate their artwork, thus placing an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce. 99

Consequently, the court held that the New York statute is not
justifiable and fails the second portion of the test. An injunction
should, therefore, be granted to the plaintiffs.
4.

The Act Subjects Users to InconsistentRegulations

Courts have long held that certain types of regulations may only
be done at the national level."° Following this reasoning the court
determined that the Internet not only falls into this category, but
may also reach a worldwide level of cooperation.' Any individual
regulation will only result in chaos. 2 For the regulation of
91. Id..
92. Id.
93. Id. at 180.
94. Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 180.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 180.
100. Id. at 181.
101. Id.
102. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/12
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commerce, there can only be one system of rules applicable to the
whole country." 3 The court revisited several historic cases dealing
with the regulation of interstate commerce such as Wabash v.
fllinois,"' and Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.'
The court
returned to its analogy of the highway or railway and analogized to
the logic above that in these cases, just as in the case at bar,
national, consistent, regulation was necessary.) °
Moreover, the court looked at the differing interpretations
possible from the same law saying that uniformity is impossible
even if the word of each state's statute is entirely the same." 7 Even
if all 50 states were to pass verbatim copies of the New York
statute, the interpretation of each jurisdiction would produce
discrepancies in application.'
The Supreme Court has said that
our nation is too big and diverse to formulate what can be
considered obscene in all 50 states into one formulation.0 9 It
would impose to great a burden on the artist to make him or her
comply with the regulations of the strictest state or force the author
1
to create multiple copies for different markets.Y
The court said
haphazard and uncoordinated efforts to regulate the Internet will
surely stunt its growth."' The demand for uniformity demands
this
12
law be stricken as a violation of the Commerce Clause.'
CONCLUSION

The court held that the New York statute runs afoul of the
Commerce Clause for three reasons. First, the extraterritorial
application of the statute is a per se violation of the Commerce
103.
(1886).
104.
105.
106.
107.

See Wabash St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 574-75
Id.
359 U.S. 520 (1959).
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 182.
Id.

108. Id.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 183.
Id.
Pataki,969 F. Supp. at 183.
Id.
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Clause. Second, the burdens on interstate commerce exceed the
value of any local benefit derived from the statute. Finally, the
unique nature of the Internet requires federal regulation that is
consistent from state to state.113 Thus, having demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits in the face of irreparable injury,
the injunction requested by the plaintiff's was approved."'

Matthew Gunn

113. Id. at 184.
114. Id.
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